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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP, an INDIANA 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
PENNY ALLRED d/b/a IT'S ABOUT 
TIME, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appellate Court No, 
910189-CA 
Category (b) (16) 
ooOoo 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals 
to hear this appeal by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j) (1953 as 
amended). 
2. This appeal is from multiple Orders of the Third Judicial 
District Court as follows: 
(a) Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiff's Complaint; 
(b) Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Defendant's Counterclaims; 
(c) Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the 
Defendant's Request for Jury Trial; and 
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(d) Overruling Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's 
Affidavit of Fees. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Affidavit of Defendant/Appellant, filed in 
opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, raise a 
genuine issue as to a fact material to Plaintiff's right to obtain 
recovery for past due lease installments pursuant to a written 
lease agreement? Plaintiff's Summary Judgment was granted by the 
lower Court, as a matter of law, and is therefore subject to review 
for correctness by this Court. Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 751 
P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
2. Did the Memorandum filed by Defendant/Appellant in 
opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on her 
counterclaims, which Memorandum contained no statement of facts and 
was unsupported by either Affidavit or any other evidentiary 
material, raise a genuine issue as to a material fact which could 
have precluded dismissal of her counterclaims? Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was granted by the lower court as a matter of 
law and is therefore subject to review for correctness. Barber v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch.. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
3. Did the District Court err in finding, as a matter of 
fact, that Defendant/Appellant waived her right to jury trial? The 
findings of the trial court are entitled to a presumption of 
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correctness and evidence relevant to each finding shall be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the finding. The finding must be 
sustained unless it is clearly erroneous. College Irr. v. Logan R. 
and The Blacksmith F.. 780 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1989). 
4. Did the District Court commit patent error and a clear 
abuse of its broad discretion in overruling the 
Defendant's/Appellant's objection to Appellee's Affidavit of 
Attorney's Fees? The decision of the District Court is entitled to 
deference and subject to review only on the basis of patent error 
and clear abuse of discretion. Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692 
(Utah 1982). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The 
motion shall be served at least 10 days before 
the time affixed for the hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve 
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is 
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration; 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of motion. The 
points and authorities in support of a motion 
for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and 
shall specifically refer to those portions of 
the record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. 
The points and authorities in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which the party contends 
a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact 
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences 
and shall specifically refer to those portions 
of the record upon which the opposing party 
relies, and if applicable, shall state the 
numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's 
facts that are disputed. All material facts 
set forth in the movant's statement and 
properly supported by an accurate reference to 
the record shall be deemed admitted for the 
purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing 
party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered 
without a hearing unless ordered by the court, 
or requested by the parties as provided in 
paragraph (3)(b) or (4) below. 
Utah Constitution. Article I, § 10. [Trial by jury] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury 
shall remain inviolate. In courts of general 
jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury 
shall consist of 8 jurors. In courts of 
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of 
4 jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall 
be unanimous. In civil cases 3/4 of the 
4 
jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil 
cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-21-1 (1953 as amended): 
In actions for the recovery of specific real 
and personal property, with or without 
damages, or for money claimed as due upon 
contract or as damages for breach of contract, 
or for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried 
by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or a 
reference is ordered. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about June 13, 1990 the Appellee commenced the present 
action against Appellant (R. 2) . Pursuant to its Complaint, 
Appellee sought recovery from Appellant as a tenant under a 
commercial lease agreement for past due lease payments (R. 2 and 
3). On July 13, 1990 the Defendant filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim, which pleading included a request for jury trial (R. 
68). Appellee filed a Reply to the Counterclaim on July 26, 1990 
(R. 75). 
On July 26, 1990 Appellee filed a Motion, supported by a 
Memorandum, to strike the request of Appellant for a jury trial (R. 
75 and 139). On August 8, 1990 the Appellant filed an Affidavit in 
Opposition to the Motion to Strike as well as a Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Opposition (R. 141 and 145). Appellee's 
Motion to Strike Request for Jury Trial was predicated upon a 
contractual waiver of jury trial (R. 80). Appellantfs opposition 
thereto was predicated on the allegation that Appellant was not 
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aware of the presence of the waiver in her contract (R. 146 at J 
6) . Appellee filed a Reply Memorandum on August 17, 1990 (R. 148) . 
No hearing was requested by either party, and Appelleefs Motion to 
Strike was granted by Minute Entry of the court dated August 21, 
1990 (R. 154). 
Over two (2) years later the Appellant filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Court's original ruling striking Appellant's 
request for a jury trial (R 496). The Appellant's Motion was 
supported by a Memorandum (R 498). Appellee filed a Response 
Memorandum on September 24, 1992 (R. 506). The Appellant never 
noticed up for decision her Motion for Reconsideration. 
Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on its Complaint 
on September 19, 1990 (R.157). That Motion was supported by a 
Memorandum and Affidavit filed contemporaneously therewith (R. 159 
and 221). Appellee further filed an Affidavit in Support of its 
Request for Attorney's Fees (R. 227). Appellant filed an Affidavit 
in Opposition thereto, (R. 236) and a Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition (R. 233) . The Appellee filed a Reply 
Memorandum on October 22, 1990 (R. 239) and submitted the matter 
for decision (R. 270). No hearing was requested by either party, 
and Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted by Minute 
Entry of the court dated October 25, 1990 (R. 270). 
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On December 20, 1990 Appellant filed a Motion to Stay 
Execution and a Memorandum in Support thereof (R.279 & 283). 
Appellant's request for a stay of execution was predicated upon the 
allegation that Appellee's order was not final (R.279 at J 1). On 
December 31, 1990 Appellee filed a Motion to Revise Judgment 
supported by a Memorandum, as well as a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Appellant's Motion to Stay Execution (R.287). Appellant responded 
to Appellee's Motion for Revision of Judgment. The Appellant did 
not contest Appellee's Rule 54(b) Motion but rather merely argued 
that execution should be stayed to allow her to appeal (R. 298) . 
Appellee filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of said Motion (R. 
301). Again, no hearing was requested, and Appellee's Motion for 
Revision was granted on January 16, 1991 (R. 310) . Counsel for the 
Appellant jointly approved the certification (R. 311). Appellant's 
first attempted appeal ensued (R. 315). 
After the Appellant had filed her original brief and the 
Appellee had responded, this Court sent a Notice of Sua Sponte 
Consideration for Summary Disposition. A copy of the Court's 
Notice is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by 
this reference. This Court questioned the propriety of the Rule 
54(b) certification based in part on the case of Kennecott Corp. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991), which case had 
not been decided at the time of the certification. Both Appellee 
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and Appellant attempted to defend the Rule 54(b) (R. 552 and 564) 
certification. However, the case was remanded to the District 
Court for further proceedings on January 8, 1992. A copy of the 
Order of Remand is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
Following remand Appellee filed on September 3, 1992 a Motion 
for Summary Judgment on Appellant's Counterclaims, which Motion was 
supported by documentary evidence attached thereto and by an 
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees in Support of Appellee's Request for 
Additional Attorney's Fees (R. 358). Appellant filed a Memorandum 
in Response on September 17, 1992 (R. 487). Appellee filed a Reply 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion on September 24, 1992 (R. 509) . 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment was noticed up for decision 
on September 29, 1992 (R. 518). Appellee's Motion was granted by 
Minute Entry dated October 14, 1992 (R. 520). The Appellant filed 
an Objection to Appellee's Affidavit of Attorney's Fees on October 
21, 1992 (R. 528). The Appellee filed a Memorandum in Response to 
the Objection on October 27, 1992 (R. 549). The Appellant's 
Objection to the Affidavit of Attorney's Fees was never noticed up 
for decision. Instead the Appellant commenced the present appeal 
(R. 624). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
FACTS RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
1. Appellee is an Indiana Limited Partnership and the owner 
and landlord of the Trolley Square Mall located in Salt Lake City, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R. 2 and 3). 
2. It is undisputed that on or about March 4, 1987 Appellee, 
as landlord, and Appellant, as tenant, entered into a Lease 
Agreement, a true and accurate copy of which was attached to 
Appellee's Complaint as Exhibit "A" (R. 3 and 69). 
3. It is undisputed that on or March 11, 1988 Appellee and 
Appellant entered into and executed an Agreement Setting Lease Term 
relevant to the aforementioned lease. (R. 3 and 69). 
4. Appellee on September 19, 1990 filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
5. On October 9, 1990 the Appellant filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment which Memorandum was 
supported by the Affidavit of Appellant (R. 233 and 236). 
6. In response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellant 
admitted, through her responsive memorandum, the following facts: 
(a) Appellant agreed to pay rent for the period 
commencing October 8, 1987 and continuing through October 31, 
1989 (R. 160 at J 3 and R. 233); 
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(b) Appellant agreed to pay rentals as set forth in the 
summary of fundamental lease provisions (R. 160 at J 4 and R. 
233) ; 
(c) Appellant remained in possession of the leased 
premises through February 4, 1990 (R. 160 at f 5 and R. 233); 
(d) Appellant is responsible in the event of any default 
for payment of attorney's fees, legal expenses and costs of 
collection in addition to any principal and interest due 
pursuant to the Lease Agreement (R. 160 at 5 6 and R. 233); 
(e) Appellant has failed to pay lease payments and is in 
default of the Lease Agreement (R. 160 at f 7 and R. 233). 
7. Appellee alleged in its Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Supporting Affidavit that there existed a balance due and owing 
pursuant to the Lease Agreement in the sum of $13,300.32 as of 
February 4, 1990 (R. 222 at 1 7 and 160 at J 8). 
8. The Affidavit of Appellant, filed in opposition to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, alleges the following facts relevant 
to the present appeal: 
(a) flI do not dispute that the amount due and owing 
under the terms of my lease with TS 1 Partnership is 
$6,665.98" (R. 237 at 1 3). 
(b) "However, I dispute that the remaining $13,300.32 
prayed for in the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
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due and owing under the terms of the Lease" (R. 237 at J 
4(c)). "Under the terms of the lease, the lessor was to 
provide me with heat and air conditioning for my store, "It's 
About Time". "For the period of time when I was the lessee of 
TS 1 Partnership, these "HVAC" charges totalled $6,054.29" (R. 
237 at J 4 and 5(c)). "However, the "bay" where my store was 
located was never connected with the duct system that provided 
HVAC services. I received no heat or air conditioning in my 
store" (R. 237 at J 6 and 7). The remaining allegations of 
the Affidavit of Appellant, specifically paragraphs 8 and 9, 
allege that she is not obligated for certain minor charges 
which were included in the Affidavit of Amount Due of Shelly 
Sutton filed by Appellee in support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment. These allegations are irrelevant as Appellee did 
not obtain judgment for these amounts (R. 237, 240 and 
273). 
9. Appellee in its Motion for Summary Judgment alleged 
attorney's fees due and owing in the amount of $1,560.00 (R. 228 
and 161 at 1 9). Appellant does not deny this allegation. 
FACTS RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM 
1. Appellee filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Appellant's Counterclaim on September 3, 1992 (R. 358). 
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2. Appellee's Motion was supported by a Memorandum which 
included a Statement of Facts, all of which were supported by 
references to the record (R. 360). 
3. When Appellant filed her Memorandum in Response she 
conceded the accuracy of all facts as alleged by Appellee (R. 487) . 
4. Pursuant to the first cause of action of Appellant's 
Counterclaim, Appellant sought recovery of sums expended on tenant 
improvements (R. 71). 
5. The properly supported Statement of Facts contained in 
Appellee's Memorandum, and admitted by the Appellant, includes 
references to sixteen (16) different sections of the Lease 
Agreement which make tenant improvements the tenant's 
responsibility (R. 362-363). 
6. Pursuant to the third cause of action of the Appellant's 
Counterclaim, Appellant sought recovery of unspecified sums for 
business lost as a result of Appellee's remodeling of the Trolley 
Square Mall (R. 73). 
7. The properly supported Statement of Facts contained in 
the Appellee's Memorandum, and admitted by the Appellant, includes 
references to the contract provisions which establish the 
following: 
(a) Appellee had not only the right but the duty to 
remodel the mall; 
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(b) Appellee had not only the right but the duty to 
maintain the structural integrity of the mall; 
(c) Appelleefs right included the right to temporarily 
but completely close the mall in furtherance of remodeling and 
maintenance (R. 363-364). 
8. The Lease Agreement which was filed with the court in 
conjunction with Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
incorporated in Appellee's Statement of Facts provides that 
Appellee has no liability to the Appellant for losses sustained as 
a result of business interruption arising from or connected to 
carrying out Appellee's duty to maintain and remodel the mall (R. 
373). 
9# Pursuant to Appellant's second cause of action, Appellant 
sought recovery of damages allegedly resulting from Appellee having 
permitted a store to be opened in the Mall which store carried a 
product line similar to Appellants and therefore in competition 
with Appellant's product line (R. 72). 
10. The properly supported Statement of Facts contained in 
the Appellee's Memorandum, and admitted by the Appellant, includes 
the allegation that the lease contains no provision conferring on 
the Appellant an exclusive right to sell any line of merchandise 
(R. 364). 
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11. The properly supported Statement of Facts contained in 
Appelleefs Memorandum, and admitted by the Appellant, includes the 
allegation that the lease is an integration (R. 361). 
12. The Memorandum filed by the Appellant contained no 
statement of facts and is not supported by affidavits, documentary 
evidence, references to discovery or any evidentiary material of 
any kind (R. 487). 
FACTS RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL 
1. It is undisputed that on or about March 4, 1987, 
Appellee, as landlord, and Appellant, as tenant, entered into a 
Lease Agreement, a true and accurate copy of which was attached to 
Appellee's Complaint as Exhibit "A" (R. 3 and 69). 
2. The Lease Agreement contains a clause waiving right to 
jury trial. Said clause reads as follows: 
Landlord and tenant hereby mutually waive any 
and all rights which either may have to 
request a jury trial in any proceeding at law 
or in equity in any court of competent 
jurisdiction). 
3. The "waiver of jury trial11 provision appears in the same 
size print as the rest of the lease agreement and follows a bold 
faced and underlined caption which reads "WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL" (R. 
56 at Section 19.18 and R. 150). 
4. The table of contents of the Lease Agreement, which 
begins on page 1 thereof, specifically sets forth all section 
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headings including the section entitled "WAIVER OP JURY TRIAL" (R. 
9 and 150). 
5. Appellant has been in business for herself for 4 1/2 
years (R. 145 at J 2). 
6. Appellant has the benefit of a college education (R. 145, 
146) . 
7. The Lease Agreement which is the subject of the present 
action is the second lease agreement with Appellee to which 
Appellant was a party (R. 146) 
8. Appellant alleges that at the time she signed the Lease 
Agreement in question she was not aware that it called for a waiver 
of right to jury trial (R. 146). 
FACTS RELEVANT TO DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
1. On October 21, 1992 the Appellant filed an Objection to 
Appellee's Affidavit of Fees which Affidavit was delivered to the 
Court with the tentative Order Granting Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Appellant's Counterclaim (R. 528). 
2. Appellee filed a Memorandum in Response on October 27, 
1992 (R. 549). 
3. On October 27, 1992 Judgment was entered against the 
Appellant, dismissing her counterclaims and awarding Appellee its 
attorney's fees (R. 607). Appellant never noticed up for decision 
her objection to the Affidavit of Fees. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. It is uncontested that the Lease Agreement submitted to 
the Court is the operative document controlling the rights of the 
parties. Appellant admits that she is in breach of the Agreement. 
Appellant further admits that there exists an obligation in the 
amount of $6,665.98 owing to Appellee. The Lease Agreement further 
contains a provision for attorney's fees. Plaintiff incurred 
attorney's fees in the amount of $1,560.00 pursuing its Complaint 
to Judgment, which allegation is uncontested by Appellant. 
Consequently, and at a minimum, the Judgment entered by the 
District Court must be affirmed in the amount of $8,225.98. 
2. The District Court properly ruled, as a matter of law, 
that the Appellant's allegation that her store was not connected to 
the duct system that provides heat, and therefore she did not 
receive any heat or air conditioning in her store, does not 
preclude entry of summary judgment. The Lease Agreement which is 
undeniably the controlling instrument, provides that the tenant is 
responsible for the installation and proper operation of the 
heating, ventilation and air conditioning "(HVAC)" delivery system 
within the tenant's premises. Therefore, the Judgment of the 
District Court should be affirmed in its entirety. 
3. Appellee's Second Motion for Summary Judgment seeking 
dismissal of Appellant's Counterclaim was supported by a Memorandum 
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of Points and Authorities which included a Statement of Facts, all 
of which were properly supported by references to the record. The 
Appellant admitted all facts alleged therein, which facts sufficed 
to establish Appellee's prima facie entitlement to summary 
judgment. The Appellant filed no evidentiary materials in 
opposition. Therefore the District Court properly concluded that 
there was no question of fact and summary judgment was appropriate. 
4. Appellee's Motions for Summary Judgment were properly 
granted, and therefore the propriety of the enforcement by the 
District Court of Appellant's waiver of right to jury trial is 
moot. 
Further, a waiver of jury trial is enforceable if knowingly 
made. In the present case, the evidence is in dispute as to 
whether the Appellant "knowingly" waived her right to jury trial. 
When the evidence of a "knowing" waiver is disputed, the 
determination of whether the waiver was "knowing" is a question of 
fact for the trier of fact. The implicit finding of the lower 
court, that this waiver was knowingly made, cannot be overturned 
unless clearly erroneous. There is ample factual basis in the 
record to sustain the finding of the District Court. 
Finally, contractual provisions waiving right to jury trial 
are enforceable and not against public policy. 
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5V It is undisputed that the Lease Agreement, which is the 
subject matter of this action, entitles Appellee to its attorneyfs 
fees. The only issue before this Court is the propriety of the 
fees awarded. Propriety of fees is a matter within the broad 
discretion of the lower court and cannot be overturned absent a 
clear abuse of discretion or a showing of patent error. The fees 
awarded were supported by an Affidavit of Attorney's Fees, which 
Affidavit was unopposed by the Appellant. Therefore there is ample 
factual basis in the record to sustain the finding of the District 
Court. 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellee commenced the present action seeking recovery from 
the Appellant for sums which were past due and owing pursuant to a 
Lease Agreement. Upon answering the Appellant also made a request 
for jury trial. Appellee filed a Motion to Strike the Request, as 
the right to jury trial had been waived by contract. This issue 
was fully briefed by the parties and submitted to the Court for 
decision. The Court upheld the contractual waiver (R. 154). The 
Appellant subsequently filed a Motion to Reconsider the same issue. 
However that Motion was never noticed up for decision. The 
Appellant pursued the present appeal instead (R. 496). The ruling 
of the District Court is proper. 
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Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on its Complaint 
seeking recovery of $13,300.32 (R. 158 and 161). The matter was 
fully briefed by the parties, the Appellant filing an Affidavit and 
Memorandum in Response and the Appellee replying thereto. In 
response to Appellee1s Motion, Appellant admitted through her 
Affidavit that there existed a debt due and owing in the amount of 
$6,665.98 (R. 236). Appellant denied liability for the sum of 
$6,054.29 alleging she is entitled to an offset due to the non-
existence of HVAC services (R. 237). Finally, Appellant challenged 
the propriety of miscellaneous minor charges totalling $580.05 
which she felt were inappropriately charged to her account (R. 
237) . Thus, the Appellant addressed through her Affidavit, the 
entire sum alleged as due and owing by the Appellee ($6,665.98 + 
$6,054.29 + $580.05 = $13,300.32). The Court determined that it 
was the Appellant's duty to connect her store to the HVAC system, 
and therefore Appellee was granted summary judgment for the amount 
admittedly due and owing ($6,665.98) and the claimed offset 
($6,054.29) for a total judgment of $12,720.27 plus attorney's fees 
(R. 273) . The judgment of the District Court is proper. 
Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Appellant's 
Counterclaim on September 4, 1992 (R. 358). Appellee's Motion and 
Memorandum, properly supported by references to the record, showed 
the Court that, pursuant to the terms of the Lease Agreement, the 
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Appellant had no claim against Appellee for the damages she sought 
to recover. (R. 360). The Appellant filed a Memorandum in 
Response which contained no statement of facts and which made no 
reference to affidavits, documentary evidence, discovery or other 
evidentiary materials (R. 487). The District Court concluded that 
the Appellant's Memorandum failed to raise a genuine issue as to a 
material question of fact and granted Appellee's Motion for Summary 
Judgment dismissing Appellant's Counterclaims (R. 614). The 
judgment of the District Court is proper. 
Upon conclusion of the Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
Appellee submitted an Affidavit of additional attorney's fees 
incurred since entry of the first judgment (R. 585). The Appellant 
objected to the Affidavit of Fees as excessive (R. 528) . The 
District Court entered judgment in favor of the Appellee for the 
full amount of attorney's fees requested, overruling the 
Appellant's Objection (R. 614). The ruling of the District Court 
is proper. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER WHEN THERE IS NO 
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT 
The standard for entry of summary judgment as set forth in 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads as follows: 
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The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is nQ germing jgsue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law 
(emphasis added)• 
Utah case law makes it clear that Rule 56 requires two (2) 
separate inquiries. There must be a genuine issue of fact to be 
resolved by the trier of fact. Further, the disputed fact must be 
material to the outcome of the action. MThe foregoing rule does 
not preclude summary judgment simply whenever some fact remains in 
dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted." 
Healar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980). 
In the present action, there is no dispute of fact, 
whatsoever, with regard to Appellee's right to at least a partial 
summary judgment. It is undisputed that the Lease Agreement 
submitted to the Court is the operative document controlling the 
rights and obligations of the parties. Appellant concedes that 
there exists an obligation due and owing to the Appellee pursuant 
to that Agreement. "I do not dispute that the amount due and owing 
under the terms of my lease with TS 1 Partnership is $6,665.98." 
(R 236). 
It is similarly undenied that in the event of any default 
Appellant is responsible for payment of reasonable attorney's fees, 
legal expenses and all costs of collection in addition to the 
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principal sum and interest due and owing under the Lease Agreement 
(R. 160 at paragraph 6 and R. 233). Appellee incurred attorney's 
fees in the amount of $1,560.00, the propriety of which amount was 
not disputed by Appellant. Consequently, there being no genuinee 
issue of fact with regard to these portions of Appellee's claim, 
summary judgment was properly entered in Appellee's favor in the 
minimal amount of $8,225.98. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE APPELLANT'S 
AFFIDAVIT FILED IN RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S NOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON APPELLEE'S COMPLAINT DID 
NOT RAISE AN ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
The Appellant alleges that the balance of Appellee's claim in 
the amount of $6,054.29 is not due (R. 237 at paragraph 6); and 
that these charges are improper as "I received no heat or air 
conditioning in my store" (R. 237 at paragraph 7). 
However she does not allege that she connected her store to 
the central HVAC system and that the central system was deficient. 
She does not allege that there was no central system in the Mall. 
These would raise material issues of fact as it was Appellee's duty 
to install and maintain a central HVAC system (R. 250). 
It is the Appellant's contention that her store was "never 
connected to the duct system that provided HVAC services" (R. 237 
at paragraph 7). Therefore the system impliedly existed, but the 
Appellant's store was never connected to the system, and she drew 
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no heat or air conditioning therefrom. Thus the factual question 
raised by the Appellantfs Affidavit is whether her store was 
connected to the central system, not the existence or adequacy of 
that system. It is undisputed that the Appellant remained in the 
subject premises for the full two (2) years of her lease term and 
held over in the premises thereafter (R. 160 at paragraph 5 and 
233). Thus, the Appellant allegedly attempted to conduct a retail 
operation for a period in excess of two (2) years in the premises 
without heat. Further the Appellant desired to remain in those 
premises beyond the expiration of her Lease term. However 
improbable this may seem, the Appellee concedes that this may raise 
a very improbable factual issue. It is not for the trial Court in 
hearing the Motion for Summary Judgment to weigh evidence and 
resolve improbable factual issues. Singleton v. Alexander, 431 
P.2d 126 (Utah 1967). 
Appellee does not concede that Appellantfs premises were not 
supplied with heat, ventilation and air conditioning. On the 
contrary, it is the Appellee's contention that Penny Allred did 
connect her store to the HVAC system and did draw heat therefrom. 
However, this issue is not material to the outcome of the Motion 
for Summary Judgment. It was the legal contractual duty of the 
Appellant to design and install the HVAC distribution system within 
her own store and connect that system to the Mallfs central system. 
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The distribution system pursuant to which heated and cooled 
air is delivered throughout the Appellant's leasehold premises is 
the tenant's responsibility. 
Tenant shall engineer, purchase and install 
the HVAC distribution system, consisting of, 
but not limited to, supply and return duct 
work connection, supply and return devices, 
fire dampers and controls. Tenant shall also 
purchase and install VAV box or fan powered 
VAV box with thermostat, or fan coil unit from 
manufacturers specified by landlord. It is 
essential that tenant's engineer completely 
familiarize himself with the landlord's system 
and the regulations of landlord and 
jurisdictional authorities with respect to 
exhaust, makeup air, maintenance of mall 
positive pressure and design a system 
accordingly. The design of such system, is 
subject to landlord's approval prior to the 
installation. Such approval does not warrant 
performance of the tenant's distribution 
system nor does it warrant the correctness of 
tenant's engineering (R. 255). (Emphasis 
added.) 
Thus, it was the Appellant's responsibility to purchase, 
design and install the HVAC distribution system for her store. The 
Appellant's obligation specifically includes the purchase and 
installation of the supply and return duct work connection. 
Therefore if the Mall had a central heating, ventilation and air 
conditioning system, which is undisputed, and the Appellant failed 
to install "supply and return duct work connection" to the existing 
central system, the responsibility is her own. 
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Appellant relies on additional portions of the contract in 
order to attempt to create the appearance of some duty on the part 
of the landlord to perform these services. The contractual 
provisions on which the Appellant relies simply do not sustain her 
position. Appellant relies on the following contract provision: 
Central System - landlord will provide and 
maintain a central plant and a system of 
chilled air to the premises installed at a 
point determined by landlord. Tenant agrees 
to adapt to landlord's central system and 
provide a complete air distribution system 
connected to the air volume control unit. The 
air volume control unit and thermostat will be 
furnished and installed by the landlord, at 
the tenant's expense and sized to accommodate 
the design conditions as defined below in 
paragraph (1) or upgrade design conditions if 
the same are required by tenant's approved 
plans and specifications (R. 250). 
Again, the only obligation placed on the landlord by this 
passage is the provision and maintenance of a central HVAC system. 
It is undisputed that such a system was provided. Rather than 
supporting the Appellant's position, the passage relied upon 
supports the Appellee's contention that it was the tenant's 
obligation to adapt her distribution system to the central system. 
Specifically, the second sentence of the quoted paragraph states 
that "tenant agrees to adapt to landlord's central system and 
provide a complete air distribution system. . ." 
Therefore, in addition to the past due lease payments that the 
Appellant does not dispute ($6,665.98), Appellee was properly 
granted summary judgment for the additional amount of $6,054.29 
which Appellant claimed as an offset for the allegedly defective 
HVAC system# for a total summary judgment of $12,720.27 plus 
attorneyfs fees. 
POINT HT 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT, SINCE THE 
APPELLANT SUBMITTED NO AFFIDAVITS OR EVIDENTIARY MATERIALS IN 
OPPOSITION TO APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HER 
COUNTERCLAIM, APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM DID NOT RAISE AN ISSUE OF 
MATERIAL FACT TO PRECLUDE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. THE RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD BE UPHELD IF IT CAN BE 
UPHELD ON ANY PROPER THEORY 
It is well established law in the State of Utah that this 
Court should affirm the decision of the District Court if it can do 
so on any proper ground. Matter of Estate of Shepley, 645 P.2d 605 
(Utah 1982) . The Utah Supreme Court has gone so far as to say this 
rule should be enforced even in cases where the lower court 
assigned a specific but incorrect reason for its ruling. 
In any event, we are inclined to affirm a 
trial court's decision whenever we can do so 
on proper grounds even though the trial court 
may have assigned an incorrect reason for its 
ruling. 
Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). 
In the present case the trial court could have granted 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment on Appellant's Counterclaim 
on either of two theories. The lower court could have been 
persuaded that, due to the fact that the Appellant filed no 
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evidentiary materials in support of its Memorandum, the Memorandum 
was insufficient to raise a genuine issue as to material fact. 
In the alternative, the Court could have examined the 
Appellant's claims in light of the four corners of the Lease 
Agreement and ruled that any extraneous representations were 
inadmissable. This Court should uphold the lower court's ruling 
based upon either rationale. Appellee will address each of the 
propositions in turn. 
B. THE APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM FILED IN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO RAISE A 
QUESTION OF FACT. 
The Appellant's Counterclaim seeks recovery of damages in 
three categories. The Appellant asks for recovery of sums she 
expended for tenant improvements to her store. She seeks damages 
based on the allegation that she had some implied, exclusive 
franchise to sell clocks, watches and other gift items and that the 
Appellee violated her exclusive right by leasing space to a 
different gift store. Finally, she seeks damages for business 
interruption resulting from the remodeling of the Trolley Square 
Mall. 
Appellee filed a Memorandum including a five-page Statement of 
Facts all of which were properly supported by references to the 
record. The facts alleged by the Appellee conclusively established 
that the Appellant is barred from recovering the damages she 
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requests by the express language of the Lease Agreement. Appellee 
showed the court sixteen (16) contract provisions which make tenant 
improvements the tenant's responsibility (R. 362-363). In response 
to the Appellant's claim that she is entitled to damages for 
business interruption resulting from remodeling the Appellee showed 
the lower court that it had not only the right but the affirmative 
duty to remodel and maintain the Mall. Though the Mall was never 
actually closed, Appellee showed the lower court that it had the 
right to go so far as to completely close the Mall in furtherance 
of remodeling (R. 363-364). Further, the Lease Agreement 
specifically protects the Appellee from liability resulting from 
business interruption or interference resulting from remodeling (R. 
386) . 
Finally, and addressing the Appellant's claim that she had 
some exclusive right to sell gift items, the Appellee showed the 
Court that the contract contained no clause granting such a right, 
that it is a fully integrated instrument and that by its express 
terms it constituted the "... complete and exclusive statement of 
the terms . . . " of their agreement (R. 426). 
In her Memorandum in Response the Appellant affirmatively 
admitted that all of the Appellee's allegations were true. 
Therefore, the Appellee, conclusively established that it is 
entitled to summary judgment on the contract, as a matter of law, 
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unless the Appellant's Memorandum included some evidence of a type 
which would somehow void or nullify the contract. The District 
Court properly determined that the Appellant failed to produce any 
such evidence. 
The Appellant's Memorandum in Response contained no statement 
of facts (R. 487), and was not supported by affidavit, depositions 
or any evidentiary material of any kind. Therefore, it cannot 
legally raise a question of fact. Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. governing motions for summary judgment reads in relevant 
part as follows: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Appellant tries to rest strictly on the allegations of her 
Counterclaim which is clearly insufficient under Rule 56. 
Under preexisting Utah law the Appellant's tactics would have 
been considered sufficient. Prior to the 1965 amendment of Rule 56 
Utah was the one state in the union where a party was allowed to 
rest on its pleadings and receive the benefit of a presumption that 
all the allegations thereof where true. Prior to 1965 Rule 56 
stated that: 
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f,The adverse party prior to the date of 
hearing may serve opposing affidavits/1 
(emphasis added) but is not required to do so. 
He may stand upon his pleadings provided his 
allegations, if proved, would establish a 
basis for recovery. 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as quoted in Christensen v. 
Financial Service Co.. 377 P.2d 1010 (Utah 1963). 
However, the 1965 amendment added the language cited earlier 
that one may not rest on his pleadings and the decisions of the 
Utah Supreme Court following the 1965 amendment further support 
this interpretation of new Rule 56. 
Thus, when a party opposes a properly 
supported motion for summary judgment and 
fails to file any responsive affidavit or 
other evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 
56(e), the trial court may properly conclude 
that there are no genuine issues of fact 
unless the face of the movant's affidavit 
affirmatively discloses the existence of such 
an issue. Without such a showing the court 
need only decide whether, on the basis of the 
applicable law, the moving party is entitled 
to judgment. 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Company. 659 P.2d 
1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). See also. United American Life Insurance 
Company v. Willey, 444 P.2d 755 (Utah 1968). 
Finally, even if the Appellant were permitted to rest on the 
alleaations of her Counterclaim those allegations are legally 
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insufficient. Under Utah law there are nine elements to be shown 
in support of an allegation of fraud.1 
If this Court were to examine the language of the Appellants 
Counterclaim (R. 70-71), it would see that the Appellant has made 
no allegation that Appellee had any knowledge of the falsity of the 
alleged statements nor is there any allegation of recklessness. 
She has not alleged that she relied reasonably and most importantly 
cannot allege that she relied to her detriment since her supposed 
damage (tenant improvements) was contractually her responsibility. 
Finally, the misrepresentations which the Appellant sets forth in 
her Counterclaim pertain to Appellee's plans for the future of the 
Mall and not to presently existing facts. The Appellant supplied 
no evidentiary material with her Memorandum in Response to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, there was no evidence of 
fraud before the lower court and the court properly entered summary 
judgment. 
1The elements of a fraudulent representation are: 
(1) that a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently 
existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the 
representor either (a) new to be false, or (b) made recklessly, 
knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to 
act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was 
thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
Pace v. Parrish. 247 P.2d 273, 274 (Utah 1952), as quoted in Wright 
v, Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1990). 
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Alternatively, the District Court may have granted summary 
judgment based upon a determination that the Defendant's 
allegations are inadmissable parol evidence. It is undisputed that 
the Lease Agreement is a fully integrated instrument to which the 
parol evidence rule would apply. 
An agreement is integrated where the parties 
thereto adopt a writing or writings as the 
final and complete expression of the 
agreement. An integration is the writing or 
writings so adopted . . . an essential element 
of an integration is that the parties shall 
have manifested their assent not only to the 
provisions of their agreement but the writing 
or writings in question as the final statement 
of their intentions as to the matters 
contained therein. 
EIE v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981). 
(See also. Bullfrog Marina Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972). 
The Lease Agreement contains an integration clause in which 
the parties expressly assent to the agreement as the final 
statement of their intentions. 
This writing is intended by the parties as a 
final expression of their agreement and as a 
complete and exclusive statement of the terms 
thereof, all negotiations, considerations and 
representations between the parties having 
been incorporated herein. . . . No 
representations, understandings or agreements 
have been made or relied upon in the making of 
this Lease other than those specifically set 
forth herein. . . . This Lease can be 
modified only by a writing signed by each of 
the parties hereto (R. 426). 
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The Lease Agreement is the complete statement of the party's 
contractual arrangement. Further, the integration clause includes 
an affirmative representation by the parties thereto that they are 
not relying on any prior representations. Thus, the Court can find 
the intentions of the parties with regard to the integration within 
the four corners of the instrument itself. Stanaer v. Sentinel 
Sec. Life Ins. Co.. 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983). 
Courts have also considered the completeness of an instrument 
when considering whether it constitutes an integration. Rainford 
v. Ryttincr. 451 P.2d 769 (Utah 1969). The Lease Agreement is 
obviously a "complete11 instrument. The principal terms of the base 
Lease Agreement span 50 pages (R. 377 through R. 429). Schedules 
and exhibits attached thereto which set forth the respective rights 
and obligation of the party in greater detail expand the lease to 
a total of 78 pages (R. 377 through R. 455). 
Further, parol evidence is not even admissible to prove fraud 
when the fraud of which a party complains is already covered by the 
contract in question. On the contrary, it must "an additional act 
not covered by the terms of the contract, as the parol evidence is 
not admissible in the case of a promise directly at variance with 
the terms of a written instrument". Spudnuts v. Lane. 641 P.2d 915 
(Ariz. App. 1982). See also. F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Hansen 
Dairy. Inc.. 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980). 
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Summary judgment may have been granted based upon the District 
Court1s conclusion that, since there was no evidence of fraud 
before it, there was no question of fact. Summary judgment may 
have been granted based upon the conclusion of the court that the 
Defendant's allegations were inadmissable parol evidence. The 
District Court must be affirmed if summary judgment was proper on 
either basis. It was proper on both. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ENFORCED APPELLANT'S 
CONTRACTUAL WAIVER OF RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL 
K. THE PROPRIETY OF THE RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT IS MOOT 
As set forth above, Summary Judgment was properly entered in 
favor of Appellee. Therefore, there is nothing to resolve at trial 
and no need for a jury. The relief requested by the Appellant 
cannot effect her rights. 
If the requested judicial relief cannot effect 
the rights of the litigants, the case is moot 
and a court will normally refrain from 
adjudicating it on the merits. 
Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224, 229 (Utah 1983). 
Thus, even if the District Court erred in enforcing the 
waiver, that error is harmless and does not constitute a ground on 
which Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment can be set aside. 
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B. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ENFORCED APPELLANT'S WAIVER 
It is undisputed that the lease agreement submitted to the 
Court is the operative document controlling the rights of the 
parties. Pursuant to Section 19.18 of the Lease Agreement, 
Appellant waived her right to jury trial. 
Landlord and tenant hereby mutually waive any 
and all rights which either may have to 
request a jury trial in any proceeding at law 
or in equity in any court of competent 
jurisdiction (R.56 and 80). 
There is ample authority, constitutional, statutory and at 
common law, that such waivers are enforceable. The relevant 
statute is Utah Code Ann. § 78-21-1 (1953 as amended) which reads 
as follows: 
In actions for the recovery of specific real 
and personal property, with or without 
damages, or for money claimed as due upon 
contract or as damages for breach of contract, 
or for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried 
by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or a 
reference is ordered. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, a civil matter "may be tried by a jury" but does not 
necessarily have to be tried to a jury. Further, that right is 
subject to waiver. By executing the lease agreement, Appellant 
waived her right to jury trial. 
Contractual waivers of right to jury trial are neither illegal 
nor contrary to public policy. Smith-Johnson Motor Corp. v. 
Hoffman Motors Corp. 411 F.Supp. 670, 677 (E.D. Virginia 1975). 
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Therefore, they are enforceable absent a showing of good cause to 
the contrary. Id. This position, is in accordance with the 
majority of the jurisdictions which have examined this issue. 
The validity of contractual provisions waiving 
jury trial, made independently of any pending 
litigation, has been recognized or assumed in 
a very large majority of the cases which have 
considered such provisions. 
47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 85. 
Thus, the issue before the District Court was whether the 
waiver was "knowing and voluntary". 
Those cases in which the validity of a 
contractual waiver of jury trial has been an 
issue have overwhelmingly applied the knowing 
and voluntary standard. 
K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 
1985). 
Further, the Appellant carries the burden of proof of 
demonstrating that her consent was not knowing and voluntary. 
We agree that in the context of an express 
contractual waiver the objecting party should 
have the burden of demonstrating that its 
consent to the provision was not knowing and 
voluntary. 
Id. at 758. 
Finally, whether the Appellant made a knowing waiver, is a 
question of fact. 
Ordinarily, the question of waiver is one of 
fact for a jury. That is to say, where the 
evidence concerning waiver, or an element or 
requisite thereof, is conflicting or disputed, 
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or where more than one reasonable inference 
may be drawn from the evidence, the question 
of waiver is one of fact for the trier of 
facts. 
28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 174. 
The District Court enforced the Appellantfs waiver and 
therefore impliedly found that Ms. Allred made a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of her right. That finding is one of fact which 
is presumptively correct and cannot be overturned unless it is 
clearly erroneous and without any reasonable basis in the evidence. 
College Irr. v. Logan R. and The Blacksmith F. , 780 P.2d 1241 (Utah 
1989), Homeowners Loan Corporation v. Bank of Arizona, 94 P.2d 457 
(Ariz. 1939). 
In the present case there was ample evidence before the 
District Court on which to base a finding of a knowing waiver. 
That evidence includes the following: 
(a) The Lease Agreement contains a clause waiving the 
right to jury trial (R. 56 and Addendum at Exhibit "A" Page 
48, Section 19.18); 
(b) The waiver of jury trial provision appears in the 
same size print as the rest of the Lease Agreement (R. 56, 150 
and Addendum at Exhibit "A" Page 48, Section 19.18); 
(c) The waiver of jury trial provision carries a bold 
face and underline caption which reads "WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL" 
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(R. 56, 150 and Addendum at Exhibit MAH Page 48, Section 
19.18) ; 
(d) The table of contents of the Lease Agreement, which 
begins on Page 1 thereof, specifically sets forth all section 
headings including the section entitled "WAIVER OP JURY TRIAL11 
(R. 9, 150 and Addendum at Exhibit "AH Page 2); 
(e) Appellant has been in business for herself for four 
and one half (4 1/2) years (R. 145 at f 2); 
(f) Appellant has the benefit of a college education (R. 
145, 145); and 
(g) The Lease Agreement which is the subject matter of 
the present action is the second lease agreement with Appellee 
to which Appellant was a party (R. 146). 
In support of her contention that she was not aware of the 
waiver clause (R. 146), Appellant alleges that the clause was not 
brought to her attention by Appellee (R. 146) ; that the clause 
appears on page 48 of a 51 page agreement; and that she was not 
aware that the lease called for a waiver of right to jury trial (R. 
146) . 
In light of the evidence which was before the District Court 
it cannot be said that there was no reasonable basis for that 
court1s ruling, or that the courtfs ruling was clearly erroneous. 
At no time does the Appellant allege that she failed to read the 
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contract prior to signing it. Howeverf even if she were to allege 
that she did not read the contract, that would not justify the 
relief she requests. 
Each party has the burden to understand the 
terms of the contract before he affixes his 
signature to it and may not thereafter assert 
his ignorance in defense. • . Ignorance of 
the contents of an instrument does not 
ordinarily affect the liability of one who 
signs it. . . If a man acts negligently and 
in such a way as to justify others in 
supposing that the written instrument is 
consented to by him, he will be bound both at 
law and in equity . . . If the contract is 
plain and unequivocal in its terms, he is 
ordinarily bound thereby. 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch. 706 P.2d 1028, 1047 (Utah 
1985). 
The same rule would apply to the Appellant's allegation that 
the clause was not brought to her attention. It is her duty to 
read and understand the contract before signing it. 
The Appellant argues at length that the right to a jury trial 
in the state of Utah is protected by the Utah State Constitution. 
The relevant portion of the Utah State Constitution reads as 
follows: 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury 
shall remain inviolate. In courts of general 
jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury 
shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of 
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of 
four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict 
shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A 
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iurv in civil cases shall be waived unless 
demanded. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 10. 
The State Constitution clearly permits waiver. The critical 
language is the last sentence which states that in civil cases the 
right to trial by jury "shall be waived" unless demanded. It 
should also be noted that the right to a jury trial can be waived 
through mere silence. The waiver before the District Court and 
before this Court is not one inferred from silence but one 
expressly and affirmatively made. It cannot be said that the 
District Court was clearly erroneous or that it did not have an 
adequate basis in the evidence when it enforced the waiver. 
POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY OVERRULED THE APPELLANT'S 
OBJECTION TO APPELLEE18 AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
In conjunction with Appellee1s Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment (seeking dismissal of Appellantfs Counterclaim) Appellee 
requested an award of attorney's fees as provided by contract. 
Appellee's request for attorney's fees and costs was supported by 
the Affidavit of Arnold Richer which included a summary of all fees 
and costs incurred (R. 580). Appellee requested fees and costs in 
the amount of $8,760.00 which represented all fees and costs 
incurred since the granting of Appellee's First Motion for Summary 
Judgment, twenty-three (23) months earlier. 
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On October 22, 1992 the Appellant filed an Objection to the 
request for attorney's fees. However, the Objection was not 
supported by any affidavit or other evidentiary materials. The 
District Court entered an Order and Judgment on October 27, 1992 
granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment and awarding fees 
as requested. Impliedly the Defendant's Objection, unsupported by 
any evidence, was overruled. The District Court properly overruled 
the Objection and awarded the fees. 
Appellee is entitled to fees pursuant to the terms of the 
contract admittedly executed by the parties. Therefore, the only 
issue before the lower court and the only issue under review at 
this time is the reasonableness of the amount requested and 
awarded. 
It is well established law in Utah that the reasonableness of 
attorney's fees is a matter within the discretion of the court and 
will only be disturbed on review for the strongest reasons. 
In the absence of a showing of patent error or 
clear abuse of discretion, we do not disturb 
the judgment of the trial court. 
Alexander v. Brown. 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982). 
In the present case the Appellee's request for attorney's fees 
was supported by an Affidavit which itemized and defended every fee 
requested. In response to that Affidavit the Appellant filed no 
evidentiary materials whatsoever, merely an unsupported objection. 
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The ruling of the lower court clearly cannot be called patent error 
when based upon an unrebutted affidavit. Freed Finance Company v. 
Stoker Motor Company, 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975). 
Though the ruling of the District Court is clearly 
unassailable, Appellee will address the specific fees to which the 
Appellant objects. Appellant objects to all fees incurred by 
Appellee in connection with the Appellant's first abortive attempt 
to appeal the order granting Appelleefs First Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Appellant contends that Appellee is not entitled to 
fees for time "spent pursuing the fruitless certification and 
appeal of Plaintifffs claim against Defendant." (R. 528). 
Appellant would have this Court believe that Appellee pursued a 
fruitless appeal. On the contrary, the Appellee was the prevailing 
party and it was the Appellant's appeal which was pursued and 
ultimately dismissed. 
It should also be noted that the Appellant consented to 
certification of the Judgment as final (R. 312). Further, the 
Appellant did not resist the Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification. 
The Appellant filed a Motion to Stay Execution on the theory that 
the Judgment was not final. Appellee responded with a Motion to 
Certify under Rule 54(b). The Appellant then filed a Reply 
Memorandum which did not resist certification but which on the 
contrary stated that "Rule 54(b) is no answer to Defendant's Motion 
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to Stay Execution. Execution should be stayed even if the Order 
and Judgment is final and appealable.11 (R. 299-300). Even when 
this Court put the parties on notice of its concerns about the 
finality of the Judgment by sending its Notice of Sua Sponte 
Consideration for Dismissal the Appellant continued to defend the 
finality of the Judgment saying: 
The trial court's November 2 money judgment is 
perfectly suited for Rule 54(b) certification. 
It completely disposed of plaintiff's only 
claim against defendant, and for the reasons 
stated by plaintiff, the trial court 
determined that there was no just reason for 
waiting for the disposition of defendant's 
counterclaim before entering that judgment as 
final (R. 552). 
Ultimately the Rule 54(b) certification was overturned based 
upon this Court's reliance on the case of Kennecott Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n.. 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991), which decision had 
not been rendered at the time of the original certification. This 
case unfortunately deprived this Court of jurisdiction to hear the 
Appellant's first appeal and compelled remand. However, the 
Appellant voluntarily choose to file her appeal with the full 
knowledge that in the event it was unsuccessful she would be liable 
for attorney's fees. She could have resisted certification but 
preferred immediate certification and appeal. She cannot know be 
heard to complain of fees which were necessarily incurred in 
response to her abortive appeal. 
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The Appellant also objects to fees incurred by Appellee in 
attempts to collect the bond she posted as security for her first 
appeal as well as fees incurred in attempting to arrange a 
settlement conference, the only subject matter of which was the 
Appellantfs Counterclaims. Again, the propriety of these fees is 
a matter well within the discretion of the lower court. Fees 
incurred in attempting to obtain the supersedeas bond posted by the 
Appellant were properly incurred. Upon dismissal of her appeal the 
supersedeas bond was available to satisfy the Judgment until such 
time as Appellee was once again stayed. Further, many of those 
fees were incurred in negotiations with Appellant's counsel who 
requested substitution of the municipal bonds which constituted the 
supersedeas bond. At the Appellant's request Appellee prepared the 
necessary paperwork and forwarded it to Appellant's counsel. A 
copy of the joint Stipulation and Order prepared by Appellee at 
Appellant's request appears in the Court record (R. 568). The 
Appellant then failed to ever sign the Stipulation she herself had 
requested. Most of the fees incurred were incurred by Appellee in 
preparing those documents and attempting to obtain their execution 
by the Appellant. Appellant cannot be heard to complain of fees 
incurred in negotiations initiated at her request the object of 
which was to allow amendment of her bond for her convenience. 
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Finally, the Appellant cannot be heard to object to fees 
incurred by the Appellee attempting to arrange a settlement 
conference. These fees were incurred at a time when the only 
matter remaining before the District Court was the Appellantfs 
Counterclaim. The Appellant took no action to move her 
Counterclaim to a conclusion. All of the steps taken by the 
Appellee were the responsibility of the Appellant if she had 
desired in good faith to move her Counterclaim to a conclusion. 
She did not and therefore Appellee was compelled to do her job for 
her. 
The award of fees can only be overturned for abuse of 
discretion and patent error. The District Court relied on an 
unrebutted affidavit. Consequently, it cannot be called patent 
error. Further, even if this Court were to review the 
reasonableness or propriety of the particular fees to which the 
Appellant objects, those fees were properly and reasonably 
incurred. 
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed that the Lease Agreement and related 
schedules which have been submitted to the court are the operative 
documents which control the rights and mutual obligations of the 
parties to this action. Pursuant to those documents, the Appellee 
was entitled to receive a rental stream from the premises 
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admittedly occupied by Appellant. The Appellee is further entitled 
to recovery of attorney's fees in the event of any default. 
Appellant admits her default and the existence of an arrearage 
in the amount of $6,665.98. The Appellant alleges she is entitled 
to as an offset ($6,054.29) for defective HVAC performance. The 
Appellant is entitled to no such offset. 
Appellant was under a contractual duty to install and maintain 
an HVAC delivery system within her premises, and it was her 
obligation to connect that system to the central heating system of 
the Trolley Square Mall. Consequently summary judgment was 
properly entered for Appellee in the amount of $12,720.27 plus 
attorney's fees. 
Appellee also obtained summary judgment dismissing the 
Appellant's Counterclaim. That ruling should be upheld. In 
response to the Appellee's properly supported Motion for Summary 
Judgment the Appellant filed no evidentiary materials. Therefore 
the District Court could have properly ruled that no question of 
fact was raised and summary judgment was proper. In the 
alternative, the District Court may have ruled that in light of the 
fact that the Lease Agreement contained a provision that no prior 
representations had been made or relied upon, the allegations of 
the Appellant's Counterclaim to the contrary were in direct 
conflict with the express terms of the agreement and parol evidence 
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is inadmissable to contradict the express terms of an agreement. 
If the decision of the District Court can be upheld on either 
basis, it should be upheld. 
The third issue raised by the Appellant, concerning the 
contractual waiver of right to jury trial, is a moot issue as 
summary judgment was properly entered. However, even if summary 
judgment was not properly entered, the waiver would nevertheless be 
enforceable. 
Contractual provisions waiving right to jury trial are 
enforceable and not contrary to public policy. In the state of 
Utah the right to jury trial is subject to waiver both pursuant to 
the Utah Constitution and pursuant to Statute. 
Waivers are enforceable if knowingly and voluntarily made. 
There is ample evidence before the lower court on which to find 
that the Appellant made a knowing waiver of her right to jury 
trial. The lower court properly enforced the waiver provision and 
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee and 
those rulings should be affirmed. 
Finally, the Appellee received an award of attorneyfs fees in 
connection with its First Motion for Summary Judgment. An award of 
after-accruing attorney's fees was made in connection with 
Appelleefs Second Motion for Summary Judgment. The Defendant 
objected to the Affidavit of Fees supporting that award but filed 
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no counter affidavit. The District Court awarded the fees. Such 
an award can only be overturned if it is a clear abuse of 
discretion and patent error. It cannot be said that it was patent 
error to award Plaintiff its after-accruing fees in light of the 
fact that the Affidavit was unopposed. 
The Appellee is entitled to its attorney's fees and costs 
pursuant to the Lease Agreement between the parties. Therefore, 
this matter should be remanded to the District Court for a 
determination and an award of additional costs and additional 
attorney's fees incurred in responding to this appeal. (See 
G.G.A.. Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989). Finally, 
the Appellant has posted a supersedeas bond pursuant to which 
Appellee is stayed from execution pending outcome of this appeal. 
That stay should be lifted, and the bond should be released to 
Appellee forthwith. 
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DATED this p}Q day of March, 1993. 
RICHER, SWAM £ OVERHOLT, P.C. 
By UAM^/tJ^^lU^y^ 
Arnold Richer 
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EXHIBIT "A1 
FILED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Item Court ot Appeals 
TSl Partnership, an Indiana 
Limited Partnership, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Penny Allred d/b/a/ It's About 
Time, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
NOTICE OF SUA SPONTE 
CONSIDERATION BY THE 
COURT FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
Case No. 910189-CA 
TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
This case is being considered for summary dismissal on the 
basis that the 54(b) certification does not provide that "there 
is no just reason for delay," Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 
P.2d 765 (Utah 1984) and that the case may be ineligible for 
54(b) certification under Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991). In lieu of a brief, both 
parties are requested to file a memorandum, not to exceed ten 
pages, explaining why summary disposition should, or should not, 
be granted by the court. An original and four copies of the 
memorandum should be filed with the Clerk of the Utah Court of 
Appeals on or before December 31, 1991. 
DATED this /# day of December, 1991. 
Mary T/. ^ Noonan 
Clerk/ Utah Court of Appeals 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of December, 1991, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF SUA SPONTE 
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION was deposited 
in the United States mail to the parties listed below: 
Donald L. Dalton 
Robert W. Payne 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys at Law 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Arnold Richer 
Mark E. Medcalf 
Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
311 South State, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this 18th day of December, 1991. 
By ^ 'Y£/U-C<C-/ //•£•/ 
Deputy Cler]^/ 
EXHIBIT "B 
FILED 
JAN 9 1992 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
TS 1 Partnership, an Indiana 
Limited Partnership, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Penny Allred d/b/a It's About 
Time, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ydaM 
Mary T Hzcr^ 
Cterkof toe C:^r* 
Utah Court ot App^a 
ORDER 
Case No. 910189-CA 
This matter is before the court on its own motion for 
summary disposition on the basis that the case should be 
dismissed under Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 
P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991) and its progeny. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied and ruling on 
the issues raised in the briefs and in the court's sua sponte 
notice are deferred pending plenary presentation and 
consideration of the case. 
Dated this <Q'—day of January, 1992, 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of January, 1992, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail to the parties listed below: 
Donald L. Dalton 
Robert W. Payne 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys at Law 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Arnold Richer 
Mark E. Medcalf 
Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
311 South State, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this 9th day of January, 1992. 
Deputy/Clerk 
